報(bào)告人：許文盈 教授
報(bào)告題目：聯(lián)合錯(cuò)誤數(shù)據(jù)注入攻擊下網(wǎng)絡(luò)化系統(tǒng)安全性研究
報(bào)告時(shí)間：2025年05月17日（周六）上午8:30
報(bào)告地點(diǎn)：騰訊會(huì)議411-195-263
主辦單位：數(shù)學(xué)與統(tǒng)計(jì)學(xué)院、數(shù)學(xué)研究院、科學(xué)技術(shù)研究院
報(bào)告人簡(jiǎn)介：
許文盈，東南大學(xué)青年首席教授，博士生導(dǎo)師，入選德國(guó)洪堡學(xué)者，國(guó)家級(jí)青年人才。2017年獲香港城市大學(xué)博士學(xué)位，隨后在新加坡南洋理工大學(xué)、德國(guó)洪堡大學(xué)-波茨坦大氣研究所從事博士后。長(zhǎng)期從事網(wǎng)絡(luò)系統(tǒng)智能協(xié)同控制的理論研究。以一作出版英文專著 1部，發(fā)表和錄用包括《IEEE TAC》長(zhǎng)文在內(nèi)的學(xué)術(shù)論文 70余篇(第一/通訊作者 40余篇)。主持/參與國(guó)家級(jí)省部級(jí)項(xiàng)目十余項(xiàng)，應(yīng)邀在國(guó)際旗艦會(huì)議ICAISC和全國(guó)復(fù)雜網(wǎng)絡(luò)會(huì)議作大會(huì)報(bào)告，任國(guó)際權(quán)威期刊《IEEE Trans. Syst. Man Cybern. Syst.》、《Syst. Control Lett.》 等期刊編委。入選”斯坦福大學(xué)全球前2% 頂尖科學(xué)家榜單，仲英青年學(xué)者，獲吳文俊人工智能青年科技獎(jiǎng)，江蘇省高層次人才培養(yǎng)計(jì)劃（“333工程”）第三層次培養(yǎng)對(duì)象，江蘇省數(shù)學(xué)成就獎(jiǎng)，全國(guó)仿真創(chuàng)新應(yīng)用大賽全國(guó)優(yōu)秀指導(dǎo)教師等，指導(dǎo)學(xué)生獲第十四屆亞洲控制會(huì)議最佳學(xué)生論文、世界華人數(shù)學(xué)家大會(huì)創(chuàng)意本科論文獎(jiǎng)等。
報(bào)告摘要：
We discuss the security issue in the state estimation problem for a networked control system (NCS). A new model of joint false data injection (FDI) attack is established wherein attacks are injected to both the remote estimator and the communication channels. Such a model is general that includes most existing FDI attack models as special cases. The joint FDI attacks are subjected to limited access and/or resource constraints, and this gives rise to a few attack scenarios to be examined one by one. Our objective is to establish the so-called insecurity conditions under which there exists an attack sequence capable of driving the estimation bias to infinity while bypassing the anomaly detector. By resorting to the generalized inverse theory, necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for the insecurity under different attack scenarios. Subsequently, easy-to-implement algorithms are proposed to generate attack sequences on insecure NCSs with respect to different attack scenarios. In particular, by using a matrix splitting technique, the constraint-induced sparsity of the attack vectors is dedicatedly investigated. Finally, several numerical examples are presented to verify the effectiveness of the proposed FDI attacks.